by Aaron Pucetas
Over the past couple years, the Army has been unable to meet its recruiting goals. In a highly competitive labor market with record low unemployment rates, some argue that the Army must immediately improve its compensation package to steer recruits away from civilian employers. Others say the army must also make improvements in soldiers’ quality of life, through better housing and dining facilities. These proposals have merit, but they require substantial funding from Congress in a tight fiscal environment. It may also take several years to reap the benefits of these improvements. Most importantly, financial compensation has demonstrated mixed results on recruiting. Prior research has shown some positive effects but the recent Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation revealed the Army’s increase in Real Military Compensation (RMC) relative to civilian wages was associated with no change in the category 1 recruiting rate and lower recruiting rates in categories II, IIIA, and IIIB.
Instead of lobbying for additional funding and waiting years for tangible results, I propose three no/low-cost initiatives that the Army can quickly act upon to deliver assistance in the recruiting crisis: establish an Army Gap Year Program, implement an Every Soldier a Recruiter (ESAR) leave/permissive TDY program, and enact JROTC Instructor Broadening Opportunities for Officers and NCOs.
Read more: Looking Down Under and Within: Three Recommendations to Address the Recruiting CrisisArmy Gap Year Program
The Army could learn a great deal from the success of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Gap Year Program and implement its own version of the 12-month “try before you buy” concept for recruiting candidates. Under the ADF Gap Year Program, applicants go through a vetting process and then perform 12 months of active duty service in an enlisted or officer role, which includes the services’ form of basic training. Gap Year personnel are then assigned to various units for the remainder of their tenure, which is usually around 8-9 months. Near the end of the 12-month period, personnel choose to either leave the ADF, extend their active-duty contract, or transfer to the reserves. Although the sample size is small (the Australian Army, for example, admits around 200 applicants per year), the program had a 84% success rate in 2020 and 75% success rate in 2021. Success rate is defined in the report as members who elect to remain in either permanent or the Reserve workforce. Additionally, the Australian parliament has lauded the program as a great way to get talented recruits into the ADF. One may even make the argument the military recruiting crisis has been more challenging in Australia than in the United States. For example, the Australian Defence Force has failed to meet its recruiting goal the past eight years while the US Army has failed to meet its recruiting goal only the past two years. Given the socio-economic commonalities between the two countries, it is reasonable to assume the US Army would experience similar benefits.
A Gap Year Program addresses the younger generation’s concerns with long-term commitment. It also distributes the recruiting burden more equally across the force. Such a program would allow the Army and its leaders, not just recruiters, to demonstrate the benefits of service and inspire gap year personnel to continue service after the 12-month period. If the reduced commitment and “try before you buy” does not incentivize applicants enough, the US Army could go a step further and partner with universities and technical schools to make the gap year program count towards academic credits or certifications.
Some may see this proposal and think the Army will lose much of what it invests in gap year personnel if they walk away after the 12-month period. However, the Australian Army’s success rate makes this a risk worth taking. Army budget planners and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should conduct further analysis to see if the ADF’s current low-cost assessment would hold true under the US Army’s larger manpower scale. The Army should also perform additional analysis on the topic of Advanced Individual Training; there is limited research on how the ADF conduct MOS-specific training within their Gap Year program or if they delay their form of AIT until Gap Year personnel extend or transfer their contracts. Again, if 75-84% of applicants end up extending their contracts or transferring to the reserves, this appears to be a worthwhile training and readiness cost. Instead of a recruiter or marketing campaign “selling” the Army to recruits, a Gap Year Program will let our current leaders and Soldiers show people how service benefits themselves and the nation. We may be amazed by the results.
Every Soldier a Recruiter (ESAR) Leave/Permissive TDY Initiative
The second low-/no-cost proposal involves expanding the existing Hometown Recruiter Assistance Program (HRAP) so that every Soldier may conduct recruiting assistance for up to 14 days per year, pending chain of command approval. The current wording of AR 601-2 makes the reader assume that the currently espoused 14-day period is a one-time event in a Soldier’s career. The Army could make significant gains by allowing all Soldiers to conduct recruiting assistance for up to 14 days every year. An annual recruiting assistance period will help Soldiers establish long-standing relationships with local recruiter offices, high schools, and other organizations that aid in recruiting. It may also significantly reduce the burden on the overtaxed recruiting cadre.
The ESAR initiative also offers the secondary benefit of providing Soldiers with additional leave/off-duty time in their hometowns or “areas in which they are familiar.” It is recommended that the current workload maximum of 24 hours per week in AR 601-2 remain in place so Soldiers can use this initiative to visit family/friends in the area, rest, or conduct other activities; improving work/life balance. Given the struggles with raising pay and other compensation, the Army should seriously consider expanding HRAP to tackle the recruiting crisis and improve current Soldier well-being in a non-monetary way.
JROTC Instructors as Broadening Opportunities
The last proposal is to enact Junior ROTC Instructor Broadening Opportunities for Officers and NCOs. JROTC has a proven impact on recruiting and retaining future servicemembers, as well as other positive outcomes. Currently, the U.S. Army Junior ROTC website lists 495 total instructor vacancies. The Army should be able to divert officers and NCOs away from other broadening opportunities (Advanced Civil Schooling, Fellowships, Training with Industry, First Army OC/Ts, CTC OC/Ts) to fill these vital positions as JROTC cadre. These officers and NCOs can share their more recent Army experiences to positively influence future recruits.
DODI 1205.13 and Chapter 102 of Title 10, United States Code already allows Secretaries of Military Departments to authorize active-duty officers and NCOs to serve as JROTC instructors, so the Secretary of the Army (in consultation with Army Senior Leaders) can implement this proposal at minimal to no cost. Since the Army has already planned and programmed broadening opportunity PCS funds and JROTC Instructor training funds, this proposal incurs little or no cost. Additionally, this proposal will maintain all current instructor requirements (including training requirements) to ensure the JROTC program’s high standards.
Similar to the ESAR initiative, JROTC Instructor broadening opportunities provide the secondary benefits of stability and/or proximity for family and friends, as well as other activities that promote work-life balance. It may also provide unique opportunities for servicemembers and families to serve in major metropolitan areas where active-duty military is traditionally underrepresented, maximizing their recruiting impact in the community.
So, what’s the catch?
All three proposals are cheap, quick to implement, and require little to no assistance outside of the Army. But Army Senior Leaders must decide if their benefits outweigh the risks. The Army can offset training investment costs by what it may gain from the Gap Year program. The Army should also be able to offset the losses in combat readiness by allowing hundreds or thousands of Soldiers to execute the ESAR initiative and JROTC broadening positions, bringing in talented personnel to replenish the ranks and improving the work/life balance of those currently serving. Lastly, all three proposals will increase public awareness of and exposure to the U.S. military, and potentially increase trust in the military. This will all positively affect recruiting.
MAJ Aaron “Butch” Pucetas is a Force Management Officer currently serving as the AMD Portfolio Manager at Army Futures Command. He has over 15 years of active duty experience, including deployments to Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iraq.
