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How to Fail as the S6


By: Chris Byrd, Dre’ Abadie, Joe Pishock, Joshua Trimble, Brian Jorgenson, Oz Ortiz, Shawn Carden, and Charles Smith.

Two factors determine the operational reach of fighting formations: communications and logistics. The S6 is the center of gravity for the Signal Corps and it is our responsibility to ensure that commanders and subordinate leaders are able to communicate across their formations. Communication helps synchronize operations, mass effects, and enables warfighters to seize the initiative. And when units lose this ability, operations suffer.

The authors of this article are all former Division G6s and have observed well over 100 Battalion and Brigade S6s on training exercise, CTC rotations and operational deployments. Each contributor has at least three years as an S6/G6 with some having as upwards of seven years in these vital positions. We gained a sense that many officers want to avoid S6 positions and seek to stove-pipe in strategic jobs. This mis-guided intention seems to be fostered by the below-average promotion rate for Signal Officers to MAJ over the last 3 years. While many factors contribute to the low rates, it is noteworthy that officers who did well as an S6 also did well in the CSL selection where a premium is placed on leadership.

However, since the concern is there, let’s address right up front the reasons that we saw officers fail as S6s:

They try to be the “smartest” communicator in the unit.  There are plenty of technical problems to solve but that’s why you have Soldiers and NCOs.  An S6 behind the keyboard during operations means that a Soldier is unemployed.  It also means that the officer responsible for future operations is consumed with a current task.  Nobody is “in charge” when this happens.

Take a step back when you find yourself knee-deep in a technical problem. You may have to fight your own personality in these cases too. Many officers go Signal because we like technology and want to tinker. We were further trained at a Basic Course that emphasized technical skills.  However, you create more problems each time you try to fix things yourself and fail to put everyone to work. You need to run the team – not be the star of the team.

It also hurts when an S6 tries to “sound” smart instead of trying to communicate simply.  The commander wants to know that his Mission Command equipment works – not about how complicated you can make the problem sound. Here’s an example. A successful S6 would say, “Boss, the phones are out.  The team needs about 20 minutes to get it fixed.  Meanwhile, Chat with the BN TOCs is the primary and we have the FM net as back-up right now.  The battle staff is already tracking and ready to do the update via FM if required.”

An unsuccessful S6 would explain the same problem this way, “Boss, our Cisco Call Manager lost all the dial patterns for the subordinate and adjacent units. We can call other phones on site, but the Call Manager doesn’t know how to find phones at other sites.  Right now, we’re working it but we don’t know how long it will take to re-establish call functions.  Also, I updated the PACE plan on the portal.”

 Translate Signal into something meaningful and do not consume everyone’s energy with techno babble.  Intelligent officers make things simple – they don’t try to sound “smart.”

They fail to lead their team. This is strongly related to the first. An S6 is an organizational leader of technical experts. Embrace the practice of Mission Command within your team and get your people focused on a common purpose. You issue independent orders to support your unit’s mission and commander’s intent. This is an active process and requires both leadership and supervision.  It is a human interaction and requires interpersonal skills.

Too often, we see the Soldiers and NCOs waiting for instructions and orders. The S6 has locked himself away to nerd-out on equipment and failed to provide a shared common purpose. Work ceases because nobody knows their part. Look at it this way, we don’t expect the BN S4 to pump gas or cook the chow. We expect them to get the gas to the vehicles and the chow to the troops.  They do that by leading.  We have never seen an S6 fired for NOT being smart enough but have seen plenty fail because they were weak leaders.

Build your team in training and supervise them during exercises.  Your primary job is to lead the technical experts through human interaction and the practice of Mission Command.

They fail to understand their unit mission or be valuable members of the staff.  In a great staff, every officer is an assistant S3. Everyone works on the operational plan and contributes their functional knowledge along the way. Every officer can pick up the battle and turn the commander’s intent into orders.

The S6s that fail wall themselves off from the TOC floor and can be found in their Signal tent. They claim to be, “Monitoring the NETWORK,” which translates to “watching a computer screen while the world turns around me.”  Successful S6s live on the TOC floor.  They monitor the network by acting as a battle captain and ensuring services work for the staff.  Don’t make the S3 NCO look for you and fill out a remedy ticket because his phone doesn’t work.  Instead, live on that floor and be prepared to jump in when needed. When something is broken, you will know immediately and can exercise your leadership function to get the team fixing it.

They do not understand planning or plan the wrong things. The S6 needs to be involved in the MDMP process but too often focuses on solving the wrong problems.  In basic terms, your WINT dish will always point up and your RETRANS will always go out front somewhere.  Get past the basics of site selection and into the echelon of the move.  Understand how your commander and staff communicate during transitions.  Create options for them and be honest.  There may be times and places where the best the commander is going to get are the radios in their truck.  It’s OK, they just need to know so the truck can be ready.  Networks go up and down.  Your job is to create options always and know what they are at a particular time and place.

Successful S6s know their options and it makes their teams pro-active.  More importantly, they know how those options fit with the maneuver plan.  They understand there are period of risk when units are moving and acknowledge them openly and honestly.

S6s fail when they rely solely on lockstep processes. This one is hard because process, assurance, and paperwork are ingrained in Strategic Signal’s culture for valid reasons. Tactical and Strategic Signal are intertwined, but it is challenging at times to bring Strategic Signal power to bear on Tactical Signal problems that are extremely time sensitive. Remedy Tickets have their place, but S6s must remain focused on delivering the outcomes their Commanders need, when they need it. For example, jumping the chain to figure out which of the 10 approval levels between you and the Regional Hub Node failed to put in your paperwork isn’t comfortable, but it must be done.

S6s / G6s all face this struggle and the successful ones are quicker to pick up the phone and leverage the Signal support chain to get support. There isn’t a leader in the Signal chain who wants to see you fail, but the chain often has so many links that one (or two) are bound to be weak. Positive change only comes when the supported units identify problems to our leaders. S6s fail when they refuse to acknowledge the above conditions and think that the “process” is more important than their commander’s mission.

S6 is a great job.  Many of us would argue that it was the BEST job we had.  Failure, however, is very possible if you try to be too smart or fail to be a good boss and valuable teammate.  It is a position that requires leadership above all things and an understanding of operations and maneuver.  Done poorly and your commander’s voice is confined to a TOC tent. Done well, it amplifies your commanders voice across a far-flung battlefield and enables our formations to fight and win.

LTC Chris Byrd was 3 ID’s G6 from 2015-2017 and has 6 years in S6/G6 type assignments. Currently, he commands the 123rd Division Signal Battalion (provisional) and will attend Air War College in 2018-2019.

COL Dre’ Abadie was G6 1CD from Jan 2016 – Oct 17 and deployed as the USFOR-A J63 in Afghanistan during that period. He has 6 years S6/G6 type assignments and is currently G3 for 311th Theater Signal Command

COL Joe Pishock was 25ID G6 from 2014-2016 and has 7 years in S6/G6 type assignments. His is currently a War College Fellow at Columbia University and is slated for command of 1st Signal BDE (ROK).

LTC Joshua Trimble was 7th ID G6 from 2015-2017 and has eight years of S6\G6\J6 assignments.  He is currently a student at the National War College with follow-on as the Signal OC at JRTC.

LTC Brian Jorgenson was the G6 25ID from 2016-2018 and has 6 years of S6/G6 type assignments. His next job is with PACOM J6.

COL Oz Ortiz was G6 1CD from 2014-2016, 3ID Div Sig Bn Cdr from 2016-2017, and has 2ID and 1AD Bn and Bde S6 experience, respectively.  He is currently a War Col student and selected for brigade command.

COL Shawn Carden was the 4ID G6 from 2014 to 2016 and has seven years experience as a S6/J6/G6.  He is currently a US Army War College Fellow and his next assignment is with ARCYBER.

LTC Charles D. (Dean) Smith served as the Division G6 for 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas from 2015-2017 and deployed as the CJFLCC-OIR CJ6 in Iraq during that period .  He is currently serving as a Deputy Brigade Commander for the Theater Signal Brigade in Europe.

14 thoughts on “How to Fail as the S6”

  1. In a great staff, every officer is an assistant S3. That statement is too true. Great read for all primary staff, not just our SIGOs.

  2. Great read, gentlemen! Thank you for sharing your experience and knowledge. I’ll pass this article on to the SCCC team for district to their students.

  3. Great article. There are many things i would add, but this does boil it down to some basic ideas. Simplicity is good. Some other areas to consider: How do we prepare S6’s? Some of the items you mention are Soldier tasks not leader task. Are we training the leader on leader tasks? I have been retired for a couple years now, so maybe this has changed..he school house would train leaders on information it doesn’t need let me give an analogy e.g. your M4 has x number of foot pounds of pressure in the barrel..This information was provided because that is what the contractor who developed the weapon provided the school house as opposed to This weapon has a maximum effective range of 450 meters and as a leader you to set in your defensive position with ideally 400 meters of stand off…. In the signal world..your JNN can support upto X number of VoIP phones; however, you have only been provided with X number and each phone requires either a power source or can be powered over Ethernet, but must be no more than 100 meters and you need to use CAT 5e cable vs CAT 5. as an example. The problem is leader tasks are rarely developed because you need experienced S6’s with background in the current/recent equipment. Even better, develop these things before the next version of equipment is fielded and start training now. BCT S6’s of the past did not get that luxury. Most had no training and where thrown in. How many of those folks are still around? Finally, reach out to maneuver commanders. The MI community brought BCT commander and a their S2 to INSCOM and provided them a few days training and demonstrated how they could support their S2. Signal Corps needs to do the same… Fury 28 Out.

  4. Are Signal officers taught this at SOBC and the SCCC? Are they taught how to be a good S6 officer or how to be a good tech guy? Look at the training and see what is emphasized, stressed and repeated. If SOBC/SCCC is not teaching and stressing what future S6 leaders need to know and be able to do to succeed then they will fall back to what they are comfortable with and end up typing router commands. So are they failing or simply doing what they were taught by senior Signal officers? Side note, when I went to 25W SLC at Ft Gordon we were not taught anything about Signal Operations. No S-6/G-6. No Army Operations. No Senior NCO knowledge or skills; pretty much a huge waste of time, same with Battle Staff (a huge amount of potential awesomeness, but no one there to do the right thing). If you want your Comms guys (O & E) to be good at the tech, tactical, and operational, you had better be teaching it in the schools, if not you’re setting everybody up for failure. You had better go through every bit of training to see what is taught, how it’s taught, and how it’s tested. Else, you’re not really helping.

    • Having gone through CCC in 2014 I can tell you that this is a major issue that I also recognized. The majority of my KD time, 42 months before I even went to CCC and then another 6 months afterwards before I took Company command, was spent as a Battalion S6 and I felt that I went into CCC much better prepared than my peers. What was surprising to me is that we spent only a couple days out of a 17 week course of instruction on anything related to being a Battalion S6 and only one out of the four or five SGLs had any Battalion S6 experience. The majority of my class was leaving CCC to go into Battalion S6 positions as well and the majority of what we do as Signal Officers revolves around staff work. I think the technical aspects of the job are important to understand as well but CCC as it stands is not doing an effective job at preparing Signal Officers for Battalion Staff positions.

  5. As a Deputy G6 performing duties in support of the ACoS, G6 for the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, I can say with conviction that our G6, LTC Keith Hockman spends most of his waking hours with S6’s at three large Brigade’s and their nine subordinate battalions. The dividends we get on Keith’s return on investment through these youngsters are phenomenal. Hockman has quarterly Signal Forums that has at least 90% of the Signaleers (NCO’s Warrants, Air Force Communicators, civilians) present for two days (with a fun evening social!) here in Kaiserslautern, GE. The agenda is varied with each forum, yet rigid; with read-aheads sent out 96 hrs prior to the event. We pay for the TDY. Our CG, CSM, Chief of Staff attend to demonstrate their support. Our G2/G1 participate to broaden perspectives from their foxholes. Ancillary support from our servicing RHN’s/NECs from 102nd Sig Bn to our local AFCEA chapter further enhance the session. LTC Hockman has sent out this article personally to every S6 in the command. Very, very good synopsis that is to-the-point and drills down on the incredible opportunity a 6 has to earn trust from real Warfighters in their network, which will reap benefits later. I myself on active duty was a 6 at bn, bde and division-level, so us old timers are even more motivated when future senior leaders of the our Signal Corps take the time to publish guidance for youngsters we need to keep in our ranks. Thank you and Prost!

  6. Great article with some solid advice from known performers within the community! Passing this one along for some OPD/NCOPD next week.

  7. I’m reluctant to pick any one piece of advice as my favorite, but if there is one I’ve seen our Signal peers fail at it is being invested – not just “involved” – in the operation from planning through execution. That allows you to provide options to the commander and let’s the commander decide what is best for the mission. Force yourself to go outside your comfort zone and participate in the planning. Even if you’re inexperienced, everyone there will learn and be better for it.

    Great article by a team of “been there, done that.” Thanks .

  8. Good article, wish I knew more about these things instead of learning the hard way as rebranched artillery officer. While I found the signal course (then at Ft Sill) about radios and basic operations a great hands on experience, it lacked any education as to what I could expect as an S6. The Advanced Course was like wise, In all the first school did set me up as a tactical radio (FM) subject matter expert. Both talked about being in the S3’s pocket, but neither taught you how to do so or how to integrate yourself into the plans processes. I remember at the time I did a site visit to the unit I would be working for (Ft Stewart) and was asked to write up a brief summation of the S6 duties for the school’s deputy so he could understand what a S6 had to do when he was called up for a joint exercise. Sadly my experience with the school and the site visit could be summed up in a few words – what ever the supported the commander’s intent. Which was a short path to failure when it would not be done. It was not an auspicious start.


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