by Sungkuyn “Eddie” Chang
After completing the Advanced Operations Course (AOC) at the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), all students completed an online after-action report survey for the Quality Assurance team at CGSC. After a few weeks, we received an email detailing the CGSC students’ surveys regarding the AOC, and I was surprised to read some of the key points. One that caught my attention was the need to reduce the workload and provide more time for students to effectively reflect on lessons learned from the AOC material. Given that our section (and presumably other staff groups across the school) conducted about two and a half iterations of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) from start to finish, I thought this point was the opposite of what we needed. A common theme across Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) exercises and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations is that Majors often struggle to conduct detailed planning throughout all the steps of the MDMP. The inverse relationship between students’ feedback about the excessive workload and the Army’s observations regarding field grade officers’ proficiency in MDMP highlights several problems not only with the structure of the AOC curriculum but also with the generational differences in how we envision the “best year of our lives” at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The AOC curriculum at CGSOC comprises a series of classes in military history, leadership, sustainment, and tactical instruction focused on preparing field grade officers to lead in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). However, I found that the number of MDMP repetitions conducted during the AOC portion of CGSOC was insufficient to provide students with the ability to reach proficiency in the process. Continuous breaks in planning efforts in 4- to 6-hour blocks with constant interruptions created an environment unsuitable for students to conduct continuous operations. Furthermore, during the five months of AOC, our staff section only conducted two and a half repetitions of MDMP (brigade-level M000, M400, and half a repetition of M300 – defensive planning). The requirements for CGSOC to produce Master’s in Operational Studies (MOS) degree for all students, limited faculty and staff, and overall course design significantly limit what CGSOC can provide to its students.
Changes to the CGSC structure will not be the sole requirement to fix the problem; future CGSC students must also aspire to a higher standard. CGSC students must be more actively involved in learning how to think, rather than what to think. One of the observations in my MDMP sessions was that a small group of dedicated individuals did the heavy lifting in the planning process, while others sat on the sidelines, content to be mere training aids. Every day, all CGSC students should approach learning with the question: How can I use this to fight effectively and bring our people home from war? LTG (ret) Milford Beagle, the former Commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), mentioned to our CGSC class during an International Hall of Fame event how serious in-class discussions became the day after 9/11 because everyone knew that the world had fundamentally changed and that they would be going to war. Do we need another catastrophic event to serve as the catalyst for CGSC students to take their work seriously? If the current indicators of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) in today’s operational environment hold, we must be ready for anything.
Given the current state of the curriculum and even with ongoing revisions to improve it, future CGSC students must arrive at the school prepared to engage in self-learning. The CGSOC curriculum is hampered by several academic requirements, such as Joint Professional Military Education Level I requirements, MOS degree, limited faculty, and other external factors beyond the students’ control. However, during the course, there will be ample time to read the assigned material and reflect on its meaning and implications for your future use of those tools. The narrative of “it’s only a lot of reading if you do it” is the antithesis of what the Army needs from its field-grade leaders. For those attending CGSOC in the coming years, seek as many opportunities as possible now to read doctrine, recent service publications, and other materials to prepare for your year in the schoolhouse. Take some time to internalize your weaknesses and plan to address them during this pivotal transition at CGSOC. The current operational environment requires us to be the best versions of ourselves. If you approach your year at CGSC as spoon-fed instruction in military education, you will be doing a disservice to your next unit and missing an opportunity to reflect on what it means to become a great field-grade officer.
MAJ Sungkuyn “Eddie” Chang is a U.S. Army Infantry officer currently serving as the XO of 2-327 IN, “No Slack,” 1MBDE, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He has served in the 4th ID, 10th MTN DIV, and was an Olmsted Scholar.
