by Andrew DeMoss and Luke VanAntwerp
Over a century ago, on the European battlefields of World War I, new technologies in the form of machine guns and massed artillery forced armies into trenches. Leaders turned to other new technologies such as armored vehicles and aircraft to get their troops out of the trenches and find a decisive advantage.
Today in Ukraine, commanders are facing the same dilemma. This time they seek an upper hand through unmanned systems, electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, information operations, and space capabilities.
Battlefield advantage and ultimately victory will likely fall to the force with greater flexibility and ability to innovate. Ukraine’s biggest competitive advantage at the tactical and operational levels has been the ability of units to experiment with new technologies. For example, despite current ammunition shortages the Ukrainians have have held off Russian assaults using cheap drones with organically developed tactics purpose-built by the operators. They have also paired this with new electronic warfare capabilities and techniques at the lowest level unit to provide force protection.
Would the United States military adapt as effectively? Given our tendency to rely on the legacy acquisitions process and exquisite capabilities, it is likely the U.S. would struggle to adapt like the Ukrainians
The United States Army and our biggest technology providers are not task organized, do not have the proper procurement methods, and do not have the right mindset to innovate rapidly enough to ensure victory in the next war. Establishing an urgent and efficient culture of innovation occurs most quickly when in conflict. However, we must make pre-conflict changes if we hope to be ready. This would enable the US Army to constantly adapt and already have solutions to tough problems in-hand if conflict does break out.
Humans Are More Important Than Hardware
Innovation starts with individuals—their creativity, ingenuity, and training. As an organization the Army needs to encourage and incentivize technical expertise for its leaders. This could include professional certifications, advanced degrees, or military schooling that increases the technical literacy of the force. Units must identify Soldiers with educational backgrounds, natural aptitudes, or unique experiences and then put them in positions to use these skills. These Soldiers will be better able to assess what is in the realm of possible when looking for solutions to operational capability gaps.
Also, with a greater technical proficiency, operational units will be better prepared to collaborate with other entities such as government research laboratories, industry partners, and even academic institutions. By leveraging operational experience and technical proficiency of the warfighter as well as forging strong connections and relationships with mission partners the US Army will be able to more quickly arrive at solutions to tough problems.
Only by investing in our people and in relationships will we be able to find an edge in a future conflict.
Technology is the Easy Part
Producing a technology or gadget is only the first step. The hard part is converting tech into a true military capability useful and able to fill an operational gap. Doing this will require some institutional changes which will allow the military to really innovate and enable operations.
Units need to structure themselves at the right echelons to facilitate innovation. Innovation cells or technical operations companies need to be established and then task organized, manned, and employed properly. These formations should be small, flexible, and staffed with the people with the right skills and experience. They should also be close enough to the problem to fully understand the operational requirements, but far enough removed to be and to focus on finding solutions to these problems. This likely means that these innovation cells should exist at the 2-star level and technical operations companies should exist at the O-6 level. This way they can pull the right people from across the organization and have the widest influence without over burdening the organization with the manpower requirement.
In addition to purpose built technical operations units, staffs, and tactical formations must be willing to change and adapt to accommodate and integrate new capabilities. This might be a technical intelligence section that can process, exploit, and disseminate data from a new electronic warfare or signals intelligence system. It could also include rapidly educating leaders on new unmanned systems so it can be integrated into small unit tactics or close quarters battle training. This is a cultural shift that must occur at all echelons. This has not happened in the past for several reasons including the lack of understanding, the recent changes to the battlefield and technologies, and no institutionalized model for manning and training against technical problem sets on a large scale. In the past we have relied on contracted support, but the rapid pace of change today means that it must occur within operations units in a more systematic way.
The Innovation Cycle: ACED
Recent conflicts were driven by the targeting cycle. Now we need an innovation cycle to drive the development of new capabilities. Critically, this cycle must be responsive to the problems at the front line, and this will require constant communication and engagement with partners and allies. The United States has an opportunity to do this now by observing the war in Ukraine and staying engaged with our partners there to learn about their experiences and struggles. This way we can provide value to them now and be more effective ourselves in a future conflict. The cycle must also be able to effectively evaluate solutions and be flexible enough to fail, learn, and move on to the next option. Finally, it will require leaders and practitioners who are disciplined, humble, and bold problem solvers able to leverage their operational understanding and build relationships with mission partners to build solutions to tough problems using the following model:
Assess: Units have limited time and resources, and thus must choose carefully which new capabilities to pursue based on input from around the formation. The decision criteria for new projects could include the following:
- Operational requirements.
- Usefulness to each specific unit’s mission set.
- Expertise within the formation or partners to experiment with new technologies.
- Sufficient resources to mature the capability in terms of time, money, and materiel.
- Technology readiness level of potential solutions.
Collaborate: Operational units must build relationships with the right people to support the project. This can be allies, research labs, commercial entities, or agencies. These partnerships will provide authorities, funding, continuity, expertise, and program management that operational formations do not typically have.
Experiment: Innovation cells or technical operations companies identify and evaluate the different technologies that could be applicable to solve the operational gaps. Following this, units can work with partners and companies to determine which systems are the most appropriate. They then acquire the systems, learn its technical aspects, and train with it on an individual level. Technical operations companies then deploy systems in large collective training events, such as a CTC rotation or multinational exercise, or operationally test the technologies in theater to determine if it can functionally perform the expected tasks. This is iterative and helps to inform decision makers on the usefulness and suitability of the system. The last consideration will be reorganizing the staff sections and task organizations to make best use of the system. Disseminate: To make the new technology a true capability for the Army it must be distributed to other units with similar operationally requirements. The innovators can provide their experience with the new capability to a higher headquarters S8, force modernization command, or innovation cell for management and adoption. It will become their responsibility to fully own the system by creating a “program of record” or even better a “capability or record” that can adapt over time. The higher headquarters can also disseminate new capabilities and tactics from across their subordinate units to increase all units’ effectiveness. How this happens will be different at all echelons and for each project, but it is a critical step to ensure that capability gaps are filled across the force.
Innovation is a Culture
For decades we have relied on our exquisite systems, but now that even non-state actors and violent extremists possess high end weapons, we need low-cost and attritable systems that are tailorable to specific missions. The recent destruction of American MQ-9’s over Yemen by Houthi rebels highlights our current vulnerabilities. Today our slow and exacting acquisitions systems provide exquisite high-cost systems. Tomorrow, conflicts will likely demand that the lowest echelons are able to rapidly procure new capabilities that are good enough to solve the problem. How we choose to solve this problem could very well be the difference between a decisive victory or a pyrrhic victory in a future conflict.
Ukraine is a battle lab we can learn a lot from, and one of the key lessons for western militaries is on the rapidly changing impact of technology and how an innovation cycle is needed to keep up. This is not easy, and transforming the way the US conducts innovation, from the highest levels of DOD programs all the way down to tactical battalions and platoons, does not come without a cost. However, it is necessary we transform how we do innovation, despite the costs and challenges. To do so, we can focus on three things:
- People and relationships are the most important part of the solution, and they must be developed to be able to overcome problems.
- Units must change their formations to optimize for rapid innovation.
- Mastering the innovation cycle will allow for quickly identifying and integrating new solutions into operations.
Prioritizing innovation will allow for more survivable and lethal units. This is the only way for the United States to cost effectively maintain its competitive advantage over adversaries and increase the number of dilemmas it can impose on enemy decision makers.
Major Andrew DeMoss is a US Army special forces officer who commanded the Advanced Technical Operations Company in 10th Special Forces Group and has operational experience in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds master’s degrees in both Astronautical Engineering and Space Systems Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School.
Colonel Luke VanAntwerp is the Force Modernization Director at the United States Army Special Operations Command. He was previously the 10th Special Forces Group Commander during and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and led the stand up of the SOF Coalition to train, equip, and provide assistance to Ukrainian Special Operation Forces.
