by Brandon Eans
In a world where technological advancements continuously reshape the battlefield, the U.S. Army’s premier institutions stand as a testament to the enduring power of ancient warfare principles. Embracing this timeless wisdom, Carl von Clausewitz, a nineteenth-century Prussian philosopher of war, observed that “The study of war and warfare is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.” This philosophy deeply influenced retired Army Lieutenant General (LTG) H. R. McMaster, especially during his tenure as Commanding General (CG) of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) and Fort Moore. The Centers of Excellence are responsible for educating, training, and developing leaders to fight and win on any battlefield, present and future. At the MCoE, LTG McMaster ardently advocated for studying classical war theories, recognizing their timeless relevance in preparing military leaders.
Classical war theorists like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, a fifth-century B.C. general and strategist, remain critically valuable sources of wisdom for current and future military leaders. Writings like Clausewitz’s theory of friction in war and Sun Tzu’s theory of deception continue to equip modern military professionals to understand and navigate the modern battlefield. Despite the significant evolution of modern warfare, technology, and the geopolitical landscape, these historical strategists still provide indispensable insights for professional military education (PME). The question is not whether these classical theories are still relevant, but how they can continue to educate and shape the understanding of war among leaders today.
Classical Insights in PME
The military’s foundational statement about the purpose of PME is known as the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), a military doctrine published in 2020. The PME doctrine explains that the military must cultivate leaders for the 21st century who are adept in the intricacies of warfare strategy and uphold an ethical stance on the use of force. PME doctrine asserts, “Officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, the spectrum of conflict, and the art and science of warfighting.” The military asserts that its leaders need to be experts, and studying classical theorists is a critical part of getting them there.
While there are nuances across the PMEs of different military branches, all the branch doctrines revolve around two themes: the art and science of warfare, and historical war theories. For example, Marine Corps doctrine specifies that the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) graduates must be, “knowledgeable in the art and science of warfare, specifically historical and contemporary warfare theories.” This emphasis underscores how the study of classical theorists is a pivotal element of professional education, ensuring that future leaders understand the foundational principles that guide strategic and ethical military engagements. The timeless strategies and insights of masters like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu offer invaluable guidance for navigating the complexities of modern warfare.
Clausewitz’s Theory of Friction
Classical. As one example of the way studying classical theorists can guide modern military professionals today, take a moment to consider Clausewitz’s theory of friction. In his book On War, Clausewitz defines friction as “the force that makes the easy so difficult.” Clausewitz illustrates this definition with an analogy to the “most natural of movements, walking.” He states that walking is natural and easy, but walking becomes more complicated when met with resistance, like bad weather. On the battlefield, fog or rain are sources of friction that can delay the movement of troops or impact the range of an artillery round. Clausewitz builds on this concept by observing that accumulating multiple forms of friction can cripple a formation. He states that “countless minor incidents–the kind you can never really foresee–combine to lower the general level of performance so that one always falls far short of the intended goal.” In war, friction, not the enemy, is often the primary cause of military failure.
Going further, Clausewitz argues that mere familiarity with the concept of friction is insufficient for leaders. He states that “the good general must know friction to overcome it when possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in his operation which this very friction makes impossible.” Following Clausewitz’s warning, a leader must integrate an understanding of friction’s unpredictable nature into their planning, using instinct and their professional education to avoid unrealistic orders and make sound judgments. Modern military professionals must take Clausewitz to heart and consider friction’s significant role on today’s battlefields.
Modern. Technology has advanced since the nineteenth century, making things like weather predictions and communication easier. But, at the same time, technological advancements have led to new kinds of friction in war. For example, modern militaries, heavily reliant on sophisticated communication networks and data systems for operational coordination, face a heightened risk of cyber-attack disruption. The unpredictable nature of cyber-attacks, like unforeseen bad water, adds a significant layer of uncertainty and complexity to modern warfare, often making it challenging to anticipate and prepare for their disruptive impacts. A cyber-attack is something that modern-day leaders cannot predict with precision, yet it is friction inherent to the modern battlefield.
The friction that today’s officers must overcome ranges from a cyber-attack on their communication devices to the spread of COVID-19 within their units, requiring leaders to possess the deep understanding and strategic foresight Clausewitz vividly described. Such understanding is critical for anticipating and overcoming such obstacles, ensuring mission success in the face of adversity.
An example of sound judgment in the face of friction emerged after the spread of COVID-19 upon twenty-six U.S. Navy warships in 2020. Former U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral John Aquilino understood the friction posed by COVID-19 and decided to delay releasing his crew members from isolation for a quarantine period. His decision, though it delayed unit deployment, demonstrated a careful consideration of the unpredictable nature of the virus, especially in asymptomatic individuals, and ensured the overall health and readiness of his crew.
The continuing relevance of Clausewitz’s theory of friction underscores a broader truth: the teachings of classical theorists continue to offer invaluable insights into modern military contexts, reflecting the timeless nature of their strategic thinking. Classical theorist’s concepts, originally articulated in simpler times, often parallel contemporary issues like cyber warfare and global health crises.
Sun Tzu’s Theory of Deception
Classical. To further illustrate the enduring relevance of classical military theories in contemporary contexts, consider the strategic wisdom of Sun Tzu: achieve victory by avoiding direct conflict whenever possible. Sun Tzu’s approach to warfare emphasizes the strategic application of deception, aiming for victory through strategic superiority rather than direct confrontation. Strategic superiority, as Sun Tzu articulates in The Art of War, is the art of outmaneuvering the enemy across the psychological, informational, and positional dimensions, aiming to break the enemy’s resistance without engaging in battle. How does one break the enemy’s resistance without fighting? Sun Tzu explains that deception is key: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.”
Sun Tzu’s emphasis on deception was not just theoretical. The Mongols, under leaders like Genghis Khan, adeptly employed tactics of psychological warfare and strategic deception to achieve strategic superiority, rapidly establishing the largest contiguous empire in history. For example, they used feigned retreats and left behind stragglers to mislead the Rus Army, leading them into open fields advantageous for Mongol tactics. In their campaign against the Khwarazm Empire, the Mongols utilized misinformation to deceive the enemy about their capabilities, surprising them with unexpected siege technology. The Mongols’ strategic use of misinformation and deception to manipulate their enemy demonstrated Sun Tzu’s assertion that warfare hinges on deception.
Modern. We can find Sun Tzu’s theory of deception at work today in the Army’s Psychological Operations (PSYOP) branch. The PSYOP branch of the Army has four key missions: influencing information, deliberately deceiving, advising governments, and providing communications for rescue efforts. To achieve the second mission, soldiers use psychological warfare to intentionally mislead enemy forces during combat. Military professionals and PSYOP operatives win without fighting by employing deception and non-lethal psychological tactics, just as Sun Tzu counseled.
Classical Theorists: Cornerstones of Professional Military Education
The study of classical war theorists like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu transcends mere academic exercise; it is a fundamental cornerstone for military leaders to master their profession. Leaders who immerse themselves in these historical insights will learn to understand warfare’s timeless principles, from strategic planning to psychological operations. This depth of knowledge is crucial, as it enables them to adapt age-old strategies to modern warfare’s ever-evolving landscape, effectively overcoming contemporary challenges.
Conversely, neglecting the study of classical theorists could result in significant deficiencies in a military leader’s strategic toolkit. Without the foundational insights of our predecessors in war, leaders might find themselves ill-equipped to navigate the complex dynamics of modern warfare, potentially leading to strategic errors and missed opportunities. As warfare continues to evolve, the teachings of classical theorists remain a guiding light, offering invaluable lessons and strategic frameworks essential for cultivating adept and visionary military leaders in the 21st century.
Major Brandon M. Eans is an Army Field Artillery Officer attending the Space Force Intermediate Level Education (ILE) at Johns Hopkins University. He recently served as a Field Artillery Career Manager assigned to Fort Knox’s Human Resources Command (HRC). He has served as a Squadron Fire Support Officer (FSO), Aide-de-Camp, Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, and Troop FSO.
